THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
FAR EASTERN (CHINA).
CONFIDENTIAL.
January 17, 1939.
SECTION 2.
[F 508/14/10]
Copy No.
Sir A. Clark Kerr to Viscount Halifax.-(Received January 17, 1939.)
(No. 968.)
HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Shanghai presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of despatch No. 110 from His Majesty's Consul-General, Shanghai, dated the 10th November, 1938, respecting the Japanese occupation of Hankow.
Shanghai, November 24, 1938.
Enclosure.
(No. 110.) Sir,
Acting Consul-General Whitamore to Sir A. Clark Kerr.
Hankow, November 10, 1938. THE scenes of loyalty to the generalissimo and of genuine if subdued elation which attended the Double Tenth Celebration gave no indication that the occupation of Hankow by the Japanese would be completed in little over a fortnight. Soon after the middle of the month. however, it had become evident to intelligent Chinese in Hankow that the fall of the city could no longer be delayed and the impetus of evacuation along the western road to Shasi was greatly augmented. Looking back, it is possible to analyse the factors which played their part in the Chinese decision to evacuate Hankow. The chief consideration was undoubtedly strategic, a tactical retreat to escape the Japanese encircling movement which had reached the Ping-Han Railway at Hsinyang and threatened in the Hsienning area to cut railway communication with Changsha and the south-west. It was noticeable that comparatively few troops passed through Hankow in their retreat to Changsha and the Han River and the ultimate intention was apparently to leave the path to Hankow completely clear of troops, so that the main body of the invading force, concentrating on Wuhan as its objective, would leave time for a Chinese withdrawal on predetermined lines; there is good reason to believe that the plan has been successfully carried out. It had in fact been evident to observers for some weeks back that the much-vaunted last-ditch defence of Hankow had become little more than a slogan repeated to sustain the morale of the townsfolk by giving the impression of a united body of resistance and as an encouragement to the soldiers defending the Yangtze front: the speedy loss of Canton and the conviction that the Japanese victory in the south had been secured by bribery had consequently a most damaging effect on morale in Hankow and undoubtedly accelerated the abandonment of the city's defences. Meanwhile, the tact and perseverance of Father Jacquinot and the Safety Zone Committee had been instrumental in convincing Mme. Chiang Kai-shek of the merits of a scheme which involved the demilitarisation of the entire ex-Concession area and, in accepting the plans for a safety zone, the Chinese command were thus enabled to make a virtue of what was already considered a necessity. In an address to journalists on the 25th October Mr. Hollington Tong put the Chinese case for evacuation by emphasising the need for the Chinese army to take the initiative in withdrawing their most valuable troops from an area which had no longer any military significance in order to continue their policy of wearing down the enemy by prolonged warfare (see enclosure No. 1()).
2. Formal approval was given by the Chinese Government on the 23rd October to the establishment in the Hankow ex-Concession area of a refugee (1) Not printed.
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